The email looks routine. It comes from a vendor your team has paid for years, references a real invoice, and uses the same signature block as always. It says the vendor has switched banks and asks that the next payment go to the new account.
Accounts payable updates the record. The payment goes out. Three weeks later, the real vendor calls asking why they haven't been paid.
This week is International Fraud Awareness Week, and this scenario is one of the most common and costly frauds organizations face. It doesn't rely on malware or a sophisticated hack. It relies on a normal business process and a request that looks legitimate.
The numbers behind the email
The Association for Financial Professionals' 2026 Payments Fraud and Control Survey found that 76% of organizations were targeted by attempted or completed payments fraud in 2025. Business email compromise (BEC) affected 74% of organizations, up from 63% the year before.
The FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report puts a dollar figure on it: business email compromise caused more than $3 billion in reported losses last year, second only to investment fraud. Most of that money moved by wire transfer.
And the FBI's report included a new section on AI-enabled crime for the first time. Attackers are using AI tools to write convincing messages that match the tone of executives and vendors, and in some cases to clone voices for follow-up calls.

Why year-end raises the risk
The last weeks of the year create almost ideal conditions for payment fraud.
More payments, more pressure. Year-end closes, budget spend-downs, and holiday schedules push more invoices through accounts payable in less time.
Thinner coverage. Vacations mean approvers are out and backups are handling requests they don't see every day.
Familiar names. Fraudsters often compromise or imitate a real vendor's email account, so the request comes from a name your team already trusts.
Urgency that feels normal. "We need this paid before the holiday" is a reasonable request in December. It's also exactly what a fraudster would say.
Public agencies face added exposure
State and local governments and school districts have an additional challenge: transparency. Contract awards, vendor names, and payment amounts are often public record, published on agency websites or board agendas. That openness serves residents, but it also gives fraudsters a ready-made list of who gets paid, how much, and when.
And once a fraudulent payment clears, getting the money back is far from guaranteed.
Financial services firms are a target, too
Banks, credit unions, investment advisers, and insurers know payment fraud from the customer side. But their own accounts payable teams, vendor relationships, and executive inboxes are targets as well. A firm that spends its days protecting client accounts can still lose money through a spoofed vendor invoice on its own books.

Fraud is a process problem with a technology layer
Email filters and security tools catch a lot. But the most effective defenses against payment fraud are process controls that hold up even when a fraudulent email gets through.
Verify by calling a known number. Any request to change banking details should be confirmed by phone, using a number already on file, never one provided in the email.
Require two people for bank changes. No single employee should be able to change vendor payment details and release a payment.
Hold new banking details. A short waiting period before the first payment to new account information gives time for verification.
Watch for mailbox tampering. Attackers who take over an internal or vendor email account often create inbox rules to hide replies. Monitoring for new forwarding and filtering rules catches many compromises early.
Protect email accounts. Multifactor authentication on every mailbox, especially finance, executive, and accounts payable accounts, makes account takeover much harder.
Practice the scenario. A short tabletop exercise with finance, accounts payable, and IT reveals where the process bends under pressure before a real request tests it.
Review the vendor master file. Periodic reviews of recent banking changes catch fraud that slipped through and highlight vendors that should be inactive.

Bringing finance and security together
Payment fraud sits between departments. Finance owns the payment process. IT owns the email system. Leadership owns the risk. When no one owns the whole picture, fraudsters find the gap between them.
That's where security leadership matters. Someone needs to look at the payment process end to end, connect the technical controls to the business steps, and make sure the policies match how people work during a busy December.
How Tec-Refresh helps
Tec-Refresh's Cybersecurity Advisory and vCISO services give organizations experienced security leadership without a full-time executive hire. For payment fraud, that means reviewing your payment and vendor management processes, aligning email security controls with finance workflows, running tabletop exercises with your accounts payable and finance teams, and building verification policies people can follow under pressure.
For public agencies and financial services firms heading into year-end, it's a practical way to close the gap between the people who move money and the people who protect the systems it moves through.
One phone call
Fraud Awareness Week is a good moment to ask a simple question: if a trusted vendor emailed tomorrow asking to change their bank account, what would your team do?
If the answer is "update the record," a single phone call to a known number could be the most valuable control you add this year.
Close the Gap Between Finance and Security
Our vCISO team reviews payment and vendor processes, aligns email security with finance workflows, and runs tabletop exercises so your team knows what to do when a "new bank account" request arrives.
Talk to Our Advisory Team